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Abstract
The paper tests whether or not the eﬀects on sectoral wages of
internal and external factors depend upon the sector’s relative wage
position. The key hypothesis is that workers in low—wage sectors are
more concerned with relative wages than workers in high wage sec-
tors. To test the hypothesis, we make use of panel data and formu-
late a smooth transition regression model including relative wages as
the transition variable. The empirical results provide strong evidence
of nonlinear wage responses to industry profitability, outside wages
and unemployment. The estimated long—run insider weight and the
unemployment eﬀect are much higher in high—wage industries than
in low—wage industries. The main results are robust to alternative
transformations of the unemployment rate and we also provide some
evidence of nonlinear eﬀects using regional panel data.
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1 Introduction
The paper investigates the importance of insider forces in the Norwegian
wage formation process using industry and regional panel data. A key issue
will be to test whether or not the eﬀect of sector specific variables depend
upon the sector’s relative wage position. Our hypothesis is that low—wage
sectors mainly act as wage followers while high—wage sectors are wage leaders.
We therefore suggest that insider forces are more important in high—wage
sectors than in low—wage sectors where the outside wage is hypothesized to
play a dominant role. To investigate the possibility of such a nonlinear wage
responses to internal and external factors, we formulate a smooth transition
regression (STR) model, following the approach suggested by Granger and
Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1998).
The basic idea is that pay is shaped by a mixture of internal and external
factors. This feature is common to several models where wage setting can be
regarded as a form of rent—sharing such as union bargaining models (Dunlop,
1944, Hoel and Nymoen, 1988, Nickell and Andrews, 1983), insider—outsider
models (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988), and some versions of eﬃciency wage
theories (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, Agell and Lundborg, 1995a).
The presence of a permanent relation between industry wages and indus-
try profitability is evidence against competitive forces in the labour market,
but also evidence against completely centralized wage setting. In a com-
petitive labour market, wages would be equalized, except for compensating
wage diﬀerentials due to diﬀerences in workers’ skill and human capital, or in
working conditions. In a completely centralized wage setting system, wages
are fully determined through nation—wide bargaining, and wage diﬀerentials
reflect the preferences and bargaining power of the central labour market
organizations.
Norway is often considered an economy with highly centralized and co—
ordinated wage setting. It may therefore be argued that firm or industry
specific factors are of limited importance in shaping firm or industry specific
wages. However, wage bargaining in Norway takes place at both the national
and the firm level. Within manufacturing, wage drift has contributed to more
than 50% of total wage increases during the post war period. This implies
considerable scope for firm or industry specific rent sharing.
The empirical evidence on insider forces in Norway is mixed. Holmlund
and Zetterberg (1991) report small and statistically insignificant eﬀects of
industry prices and productivity upon industry wages while the estimated
long—run insider weight reported in Johansen (1996, 99) approximates 20%.1
1The long—run insider weight is defined as the long—run elasticity of firm or industry
2
Using panel data for Norwegian manufacturing firms, Wulfsberg (1997) re-
ports a statistically significant insider weight equal to 5% while the results in
Raaum and Wulfsberg (1998) imply a long—run insider weight slightly above
30%.
The main part of the present paper makes use of the industry panel data
used in Johansen (1999). A particular issue will be to test the hypothesis that
industry wages respond most strongly to deviations from the outside wage
when the industry wage is below the outside wage. According to Akerlof and
Yellen (1990) wage comparison eﬀects are more important for low—income
workers than for high—income groups. Both survey evidence and econometric
results are supportive to this hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses wage
setting theories explaining a positive relation between industry wages and in-
dustry performance. Section 3 discusses empirical specification of the bench-
mark linear wage equation and formulate the nonlinear alternative. Some
econometric issues are also discussed. Results for the linear model are pre-
sented in Section 4, while tests of linearity against the nonlinear alternative
can be found in Section 5. Section 6 contains results for a logistic smooth
transition regression (LSTR) model. In Section 7 we test the robustness
of the results. In particular, some results based on regional panel data are
reported. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis is a firm level bargaining
model similar to the model presented in Nickell and Wadhwani (1990). It is
assumed that wages are determined by bargaining between the union and the
firm. Prices and employment are determined unilaterally by the firm, after
the wage bargain, in order to maximize profits. The firm faces a downward
sloping demand schedule that is aﬀected by random shifts. Because wages
are determined prior to the revelation of actual demand, employment, prices
and profits will be unknown when bargaining takes place. These variables
are therefore considered as expected magnitudes.
We assume that the union is concerned with the welfare of the represen-
tative worker employed by the firm when bargaining takes place (the insider
worker). We further assume that the utility of an individual insider worker
increases with the real consumer wage but also with his wage relative to what
other workers are paid.
level wages with respect to firm or industry level prices.
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If layoﬀs are made by random draw, the probability for the insider to
stay with the firm during the next contract period decreases with the real
product wage. A laid—oﬀ insider will be unemployed for a period receiving
unemployment benefits. Thereafter, the individual will obtain a new job and
receives the alternative wage. It is assumed that the utility of an employed
worker is strictly higher than the utility of an unemployed. Further, a higher
unemployment rate will increase the expected time spent unemployed. Given
these assumptions, the expected utility for an insider, conditional on becom-
ing unemployed, increases with the expected alternative wage and the benefit
level, and decreases with the unemployment rate and the comparison wage.
Finally, we assume that the outcome of the local wage bargain is given
by the solution of an asymmetric Nash bargaining problem. Under these
assumptions we can derive the following approximation to the static nominal
wage equation
wit = µ1vait + µ2 [wait + c1bt + f (Ut)]
+ (1− µ1 − µ2) [pct + tit + tpt] + µ0, (1)
where wit is wage costs per hour worked, vait is value added per hour worked,
wat is the outside wage, bt is the unemployment benefit replacement ratio,
Ut is the unemployment rate, pct is the consumer price index, tit is the
income tax rate and tpt the payroll tax rate. Lower case letters denote log
transformed variables, subscript i is used for industry and t for time period.2
The nominal wage equation is homogenous of degree one in the nominal
explanatory variables. The insider weight, µ1, is the main parameter of
interest, and is interpreted as the long—run elasticity of industry wages with
respect to industry prices and productivity. The outside wage represents the
eﬀects of both the alternative wage and the comparison wage. The final term
in (1) represents a wedge eﬀect. However, the wedge drops out if the workers
and the firm are risk neutral which means that wage costs are unaﬀected by
taxes and consumer prices, and higher tax rates are entirely borne by labour.
Above we assumed that workers are concerned with relative wages. Ar-
guments in favour of the role of fair wage considerations and social norms
in wage determination can be found in Marshall (1925), Hicks (1974), Os-
wald (1979), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984), Solow (1990) and in Akerlof and
Yellen (1990). Clark and Oswald (1994) give a detailed overview on theo-
retical models and provide econometric evidence supporting the view that
relative income matters for job satisfaction. Survey evidence supporting the
2See appendix A.1 for definition of the variables and sources. A more detailed descrip-
tion of the main variables including an investigation of the temporal properties can be
found in Johansen (1999).
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hypothesis of interpersonal wage comparison eﬀects can be found in Kauf-
man (1984), Blinder and Choi (1990) and in Agell and Lundborg (1995b).
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that the comparison wage eﬀect may be
asymmetric. Low—income workers are more concerned with relative wages
than high-income workers, or “Those people who receive less are of com-
paratively little interest...; whereas those people who are paid more are of
considerable interest...” (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990, p. 259). Survey evidence
from Sweden, reported in Agell and Lundborg (1995b), support this hypoth-
esis. Econometric results in Falch (1993) and Strøm (1995) also suggest
that comparison eﬀects are more important for low—paid than for high—paid
workers in the Norwegian local public sector.
In this paper, the possibility of an asymmetric comparison wage eﬀect
motivates the nonlinear dynamic wage equation specified in the next section.
Another argument is solidarity wage policy.
3 Empirical specification and econometric is-
sues
3.1 Empirical specification
The replacement ratio is excluded from the empirical model, partly because
previous Norwegian studies report insignificant eﬀects3, and partly to reduce
the number of pure time series variables. Higher unemployment reduces
wages by increasing the expected costs of being laid oﬀ. Nickell (1987) and
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) provide arguments in favour of a nonlin-
ear wage curve, and the results in Johansen (1995a, 96, 99) imply that the
Norwegian wage curve is highly convex. We therefore assume an inverted
square specification corresponding to the preferred equation reported in Jo-
hansen (1995a, 96, 99). Finally, expectation inertia and long—term contracts
are arguments for rather complicated dynamics. As a benchmark for fur-
ther analysis, we utilize the results in Johansen (1999) and formulate the
log—linear equilibrium correction model given by
∆wit = β01 (w − wa)it−1 + β02 (va− wa)it−1 + β03U−2t−1 + β04∆vait +
β05∆vait−1 + β06∆wait + β07∆
2tpt + β08∆ht + β09∆U
−2
t +
β010∆U
−2
t−1 + β011 (∆pc+∆ti)t−1 + αi + εit
≡ β0xit + αi + εit. (2)
3An exception is Holden and Nymoen (1998) who report a significant eﬀect of the
replacement ratio using time series data for Norway 1964—94.
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Equation (2) includes industry fixed eﬀects, αi, to control for wage diﬀer-
entials due to time—invariant unobservable factors, while changes in normal
working time, ∆ht, is included to control for compensation eﬀects of reduced
working time.4 Finally, εit are the error terms, assumed to be iid (0, σ2ε).
Turning to the nonlinear specification, our main issue will be to test
whether or not industry wage responses to internal and external variables
depends upon the industry’s relative wage position. Given this particular
issue, we make the feedback coeﬃcients of the level variables in (2) functions
of lagged levels of relative wages. The nonlinear equilibrium correction model
is then given by
∆wit = β0xit + θexit−1G (γ, c; sit−1) + αi + uit, (3)
where β0xit is defined in equation (2) , θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3) , while exit−1 is a
subset of the right hand side variables in (2), defined by
exit−1 = £(w − wa)it−1 , (va− wa)it−1 , U−2t−1¤T . (4)
G (γ, c; sit−1) is a continuous transition function, bounded between zero and
unity, and sit−1 = Wit−1/WAit−1 is the transition variable.
To estimate equation (3) we must further specify the transition func-
tion. The alternative estimated in Section 6 is the logistic smooth transition
(LSTR1) function given by
G1 (γ, c; sit−1) = [1 + exp {−γ (sit−1 − c)}]−1 , γ > 0. (5)
The transition function (5) is monotonically increasing in the transition vari-
able, sit−1. Further,
lim
sit−1→∞
G1 (γ, c; sit−1) = 1 and lim
sit−1→−∞
G1 (γ, c; sit−1) = 0
for given values of γ and c. The slope parameter γ indicates how rapid the
transition from zero to unity is as a function of sit−1. The location parameter
c determines where the transition occurs. If γ → ∞ (3) becomes a two—
regime switching regression where sit−1 = c is the switchpoint between the
regimes ∆wit = β0xit + αi + uit and ∆wit = β0xit + θexit−1 + αi + uit.
4The results in Johansen (1999) suggest that the log of relative wages and the log of the
wage share are both stationary variables, while results in Bjørnland (1995) and Johansen
(1995) indicate that the unemployment rate is I (0), but with possible structural breaks.
Assuming that the diﬀerenced variables are I(0), equation (2) is balanced. The lagged
wedge is excluded from equation (2) because the results in Johansen (1999) imply no long-
run wedge eﬀect. We impose equal coeﬃcients of ∆pct−1 and ∆tit−1, a restriction that is
easily accepted by data.
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A monotonic transition function like (5) may not always be satisfactory.
A nonmonotonic alternative to the LSTR1 function is the LSTR2 function
given by
G2 (γ, c1, c2; sit−1) = [1 + exp {−γ (sit−1 − c1) (sit−1 − c2)}]−1 , (6)
γ > 0, c1 ≤ c2,
which is symmetric about (c1 + c2) /2, and G2 → 1 for sit−1 → ±∞ while
the minimum value of G2 lies between 0 and 1/2. Another nonmonotonic
alternative is the exponential STR (ESTR) model defined by
G3 (γ, c, sit−1) = 1− exp
©
−γ (sit−1 − c)2
ª
, γ > 0, (7)
which is symmetric about c, G3 = 0 for sit−1 = c, and G3 → 1 for sit−1 →
±∞.5 In section 5 we use the results for linearity testing to make a choice
between these alternatives.
3.2 Econometric issues
Since the fixed eﬀects model (2) includes lagged values of the left hand side
variable, the within groups estimates are biased even if the error terms are
white noise, cf. Nickell (1981). Further, because we assume that firms set
prices and employment, vait and vait−1 will be treated as endogenously deter-
mined. We also consider current values of all aggregate time series variables
as expected magnitudes and therefore as potentially endogenous variables.
To obtain consistent estimators we make use of the Generalized Method of
Moment (GMM) estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The
model is first—diﬀerenced to remove the individual fixed eﬀects due to poten-
tial correlation with xit. In the absence of second—order serial correlation in
the transformed residuals (∆εit), wit−r and vait−r are valid instruments for
r ≥ 2. The set of instruments used in the estimation utilize the orthogonality
restrictions between the diﬀerenced residuals and the second and the third
lag of industry wages and factor income per hour. Further instruments are
lagged values of the aggregate time series variables in equation (2) .
More technically, the one step GMM, GMM(1), estimators of the un-
known parameters β0 are found by minimizing the quadratic distance
Q
³bβ0´ = ³(∆ε)T ZANZT (∆ε)´ , (8)
5See Teräsvirta (1998, p. 511) for further details concerning the LSTR2 and ESTR
models.
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where ∆ε =
³
(∆ε1)
T , (∆ε2)
T , .., (∆ε116)
T
´
, ∆εi = (∆εi68,∆εi69, ..,∆εi91)
T ,
Z is the matrix of instruments described above while AN is the weighting
matrix given by
AN =
Ã
N−1
116X
i=1
ZTi HZi
!−1
, (9)
where H is a 24×24 matrix which has twos in the main diagonal, minus one
in the first subdiagonals and zeros otherwise.6
Testing linearity against the alternative of a STR model amounts to test-
ing the null hypothesis that γ = 0. However, the model is not identified
under the null due to the nuisance parameters θ and c. Following Teräsvirta
(1998) we use a Taylor series approximation about γ = 0 as a substitute
to circumvent this problem. The test of linearity is based on the auxiliary
regression
∆wit = β0xit + β1exit−1sit−1 + β2exit−1s2it−1 + β3exit−1s3it−1 + αi + vit, (10)
where β0xit is defined by equation (2), βi = (βi1, βi2, βi3), i = 1, 2, 3, exit−1 is
defined by (4) and the transition variable is given by sit−1 = Wit−1/WAit−1.
Equation (10) is estimated using the same procedure as described above
with the exception that the second lag of the interaction terms are used as
additional instruments. The null hypothesis of linearity i.e.:
H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0,
against the alternative H1: ”at least one βi 6= 0” is tested using the Wald χ2
test implemented in DPD by Arellano and Bond (1988).
The following sequence of null hypotheses within (10) is used to choose
between alternative specifications of the transition function:
H04 : β3 = 0
H03 : β2 = 0 | β3 = 0
H02 : β1 = 0 | β2 = β3 = 0.
Following Teräsvirta (1998, p. 527) we apply the decision rule: “If the re-
jection of H03 is the strongest one, choose an LSTR2 (or an ESTR) model,
otherwise select an LSTR1 model”.
6See Arellano and Bond (1991) or Baltagi (1995) for details. The GMM estimator is
implemented in DPD written in GAUSS, cf. Arellano and Bond (1988). We use the one-
step estimator since the standard errors generated by the (asymptotically more eﬃcient)
two—step procedure are downward biased in finite samples.
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The parameters in (3) with (4) and (5) are estimated by making use of
a two—dimensional grid search. Giving fixed values to the parameters in the
transition function (γ and c) makes (3) linear in the remaining parameters,
β0 and θ. These parameters are estimated using GMM(1) for the given com-
binations of γ and c. The parameters in the transition function are chosen
so as to minimize the objective function
Q
³bβ0,bθ, bγ,bc´ = ³(∆u)T ZANZT (∆u)´ , (11)
where∆u =
³
(∆u1)
T , (∆u2)
T , .., (∆u116)
T
´
,∆ui = (∆ui68,∆ui69, ..,∆ui91)
T ,
Z is the matrix of instruments which now includes the second lag of the non-
linear terms, exit−2G (γ, c; sit−2) , while AN is defined by equation (9) .
4 Empirical results: The linear model
Empirical results for the linear model are given by equation (12), which re-
ports GMM(1) estimates robust to heteroscedastisity (t—statistics in paren-
theses below the estimates).
d∆wit = −0.211
(4.85)
(w − wa)it−1 + 0.037
(4.55)
(va− wa)it−1 + 0.009
(6.12)
U−2t−1
+0.028
(2.66)
∆vait − 0.006
(2.01)
∆vait−1 + 0.855
(42.33)
∆wait + 0.466
(8.83)
∆2tpt
−0.213
(7.07)
∆ht + 0.0029
(2.99)
∆U−2t + 0.0047
(3.76)
∆U−2t−1
+0.076
(2.98)
(∆pc+∆ti)t−1 (12)
T = 24 [1968− 1991] , N = 116, Method : GMM(1), Q = 0.1893,bσ (%) = 1.933, m1 = −4.962, m2 = −0.508, χ2SAR [98] = 110.73.
The estimate of the equilibrium correction term, (w − wa)it−1 , is small but
highly significant, and so are also the feedback eﬀects of value added per
worker and aggregate unemployment. Equation (12) implies a long—run in-
sider weight equal to 0.178 with a t—value of 3.38, while the long—run unem-
ployment coeﬃcient is 0.04 (t—value = 4.03). The estimated insider weight
9
is close to the corresponding estimate reported in Johansen (1996, 99).7 ,8
The estimated short—run insider eﬀect is also well determined, but very
small. The dominating determinant of industry wages is the outside wage.
The short—run impact elasticity is 0.85 while the long—run elasticity approx-
imates 0.8. These eﬀects may reflect a mixture of alternative, comparison
wage mechanisms or eﬃciency wage mechanisms. Most important, the esti-
mate of wa may also reflect an eﬀect of the centrally negotiated wage upon
the final outcome for wages, after the local bargain.
Equation (12) contains statistically and numerically significant short—run
eﬀects of payroll taxes and normal working time while the estimates of∆U−2t ,
∆U−2t−1 and (∆pc+∆ti)t−1are all small but statistically significant from zero.
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Equation (12) reports several diagnostic test statistics. First, the Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) m2 statistic, testing the null of no second—order serial
correlation in the diﬀerenced residuals, is insignificant from zero. On the
other hand, the m1 statistic indicate negative first—order serial correlation
in the transformed residuals.10 Taken together these results imply that the
levels of the error terms are white noise. Moreover, the Sargan (1958) test for
instrumental validity, χ2SAR (98) , is well below it’s 5% critical value. Finally,
Johansen (1999) provide evidence of parameter stability both over time and
across industry. Nevertheless, we now turn to testing equation (12) against
a general nonlinear alternative.
5 Testing linearity
When we estimated the unconstrained version of equation (10) , the estimates
of βi1, i = 1, 2, 3, were all numerically small and statistically insignificant
from zero. A joint test of the null that β11 = β21 = β31 = 0 yield χ
2 (3) = 2.12
7Johansen (1999) uses data for 117 industries for the same time period. In the present
study, one industry is excluded due to very low wages during the whole sample period.
The full sample estimates for the linear model are almost identical to those reported in
equation (12). For the nonlinear alternative, the exact parameter estimates were somewhat
aﬀected when we included the ”outlier” sector. However, all main results reported below
remain also for the full sample.
8One should be aware that the insider weight may be overstated because of the absence
of any control for the skill mix of the workforce.
9It should be noted that the estimated t—values of the coeﬃcients representing aggregate
eﬀects are biased upwards due to common group eﬀects, cf. Moulton (1986). However,
most of the t—values are so high that they are likely to remain statistically significant even
after any correction for common group eﬀects.
10The tests for serial correlation, m1 and m2, are asymptotic normal, cf. Arellano and
Bond (1991).
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which is clearly insignificant (p—value = 0.55). The economic interpretation
of this result is that the overall speed-of-adjustment of industry wages does
not depend on the industry’s relative wage position. We therefore impose
the restrictions βi1 = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, and estimate equation (10) excluding the
equilibrium correction term from the nonlinear part of the equation.
Results for testing linearity against the simplified version of equation
(10) are reported in Table 1. We first see that the null of linearity is firmly
rejected. The null hypothesis of no third order term can not be rejected while
the null that β2 = 0, conditional on β3 = 0, is rejected at a significance
level of 13%. However, the rejection of H02 is clearly the strongest one.
The last two rows in Table 1 report results testing the separate hypotheses
that (va− wa)it−1 and, respectively U−2t−1 do not enter the nonlinear part of
equation (10) . For both these variables the null of linearity is firmly rejected
against the alternative.
Table 1
6 Results for the LSTR1 model
Based on the results in Section 5 we formulate an LSTR1 model where
the coeﬃcients of (va− wa)it−1 and U−2t−1 are allowed to change smoothly
with lagged values of relative wages. Empirical results for the LSTR1 model
is given by equation (13) which reports GMM(1) estimates, robust to het-
eroscedasticity (t—statistics in parentheses).
d∆wit = ·0.028
(3.09)
(va− wa)it−1 + 0.0108
(3.65)
U−2t−1
¸
{1 + exp (−43.5 (sit−1 − 1.057))}−1
− 0.318
(5.87)
(w − wa)it−1 + 0.022
(2.33)
(va− wa)it−1 + 0.0053
(2.66)
U−2t−1
+ 0.027
(2.55)
∆vait − 0.004
(1.61)
∆vait−1 + 0.854
(40.71)
∆wait + 0.471
(9.14)
∆2tpt
− 0.211
(7.22)
∆ht + 0.0030
(2.77)
∆U−2t−1 + 0.0046
(3.50)
∆U−2t−1 + 0.078
(3.50)
(∆pc+∆ti)t−1
(13)
T = 24 [1968− 1991] , N = 116, Method: GMM(1), Q = 0.1741,bσ (%) = 1.888, m1 = −4.894, m2 = −0.308, χ2SAR (102) = 112.86.
From equation (13) we first note that (va− wa)it−1 and U−2t−1 both enter the
nonlinear part of the model with statistically significant estimates.11 Turning
11We also estimated a version containing the error correction term in the nonlinear part
of the model. However, we could not reject the hypothesis that the speed of adjustment
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to the transition function we see that the estimate of the location parameter,
c, is close to unity. This means that the transition function is symmetric
about a relative wage level that approximates the sample mean. The estimate
of the slope parameter, γ, is rather high which implies a very steep transition
function as shown in Figure 1. The value of the transition function is 0.08
for Wit−1/WAit−1 = 1.0 and 0.98 for Wit−1/WAit−1 = 1.15.12
Figure 1
The estimates of (va− wa)it−1 and U−2t−1 in the linear part of equation
(13) are both smaller than the estimates in equation (12). Using the esti-
mate of the equilibrium correction term we find that the estimated long—run
insider weight is only 0.068 in the low—wage regime while the long—run un-
employment coeﬃcient is 0.017. The outside wage completely dominate the
long—run path with a long—run elasticity of 0.932. The insider weight approx-
imates 0.075 at the sample mean for relative wages, and increases to 0.158 in
the high—wage regime, an estimate that is still below the estimated insider
weight calculated from the linear model. The long—run unemployment coef-
ficient approximates 0.019 at the sample mean for relative wages, which is
well below the long—run estimate based on the linear model, and increases to
0.051 in the high—wage regime.
The estimated long—run insider weight is graphed against relative wages in
Figure 2, while Figures 3 and 4 graph the estimated outsider weight and the
long—run unemployment coeﬃcient, respectively. The main conclusion is that
the outside wage is the main long—run determinant of industry wages within
low—wage industries which act as wage followers. Both internal factors, but
also the state of the labour market are much more important within high—
wage industries which act as wage leaders.
Figures 2, 3 and 4
A remarkable finding is that both the insider weight and the unemploy-
ment coeﬃcient, evaluated at the sample mean for relative wages, are much
smaller in the LSTR model as compared with the linear model. We further
note that the estimate of the equilibrium correction term is 50% higher in the
LSTR model as compared with the linear one. One possible explanation of
these results is cross—industry parameter heterogeneity which is neglected in
the linear model but (at least partly) taken into account in the LSTR model.
coeﬃcient was independent on the industry’s relative wage position.
12The relative wage ranges from 0.50 to 1.60 with a sample mean of 1 and standard
deviation of 0.14.
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Problems related to estimating dynamic models for heterogenous panels are
discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1996). They show
that the fixed eﬀects estimator of the long—run coeﬃcient overestimates the
true long—run eﬀect if the explanatory variable is positively autocorrelated.13
Interestingly, Johansen (1995b) reports a speed of adjustment coeﬃcient of
0.25 by making use of pooled panel data for 22 industries. The corresponding
estimate obtained by averaging the estimates from separate industry wage
regressions approximates 0.4.
The remaining estimates obtained from the nonlinear specification are all
close to those reported for the linear model. The diagnostic test statistics
reported below equation (13) do not indicate any mis—specification of the
LSTR model. The estimated standard error of the regression is reduced
from 1.933% in the linear model to 1.888% in the LSTR model. Finally, we
test the null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity. The test is computed
by running the auxiliary regression
∆wit = β0xit + θexit−1G1 (γ, c; sit−1) + β∗1exit−1sit−1 + β∗2exit−1s2it−1 +
β∗3exit−1s3it−1 + αi + vit, (14)
where G1 is given by equation (5) . The null of no remaining nonlinearity,
i.e.:
H∗0: β∗1 = β∗2 = β∗3 = 0,
against the alternative H∗1: ”at least one β∗i 6= 0” and the sequence of null
hypotheses within (14) are tested using the same procedure as for the linearity
tests. As can be seen from Table 2, the results do not indicate any remaining
nonlinearity.
Table 2
7 Some further experiments
All results reported above are based on the inverted square specification
of the unemployment rate. In order to test the robustness of the results we
13Using the model yit = λiyit−1 + βixit + εit with λi = λ + η1i, βi = β + η2i and
xit = µi (1− ρ)+ ρxit−1+ uit, they show that the fixed eﬀects estimator of λ is positively
biased while the fixed eﬀects estimator of β is negatively biased when ρ > 0. In particular,
they show that plimbλ = 1 and plimbβ = 0 when ρ→ 1, irrespective of the true parameter
values.
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estimate the LSTR1 model with the log of the unemployment rate, u, instead
of U−2. Results based on this specification are given by
d∆wit = ·0.032
(3.38)
(va− wa)it−1 − 0.0122
(2.13)
ut−1
¸
{1 + exp (−64 (sit−1 − 1.06))}−1
− 0.315
(4.95)
(w − wa)it−1 + 0.027
(2.89)
(va− wa)it−1 − 0.0043
(1.94)
ut−1
+ 0.030
(2.68)
∆vait − 0.007
(2.40)
∆vait−1 + 0.897
(45.49)
∆wait + 0.425
(8.99)
∆2tpt
− 0.124
(4.07)
∆ht − 0.0005
(0.32)
∆ut − 0.0040
(1.92)
∆ut−1 + 0.007
(0.24)
(∆pc+∆ti)t−1
(15)
T = 24 [1966− 1991] , N = 116, Method: GMM (1) , Q = 0.2250,bσ (%) = 1.886, m1 = −4.650, m2 = −0.111, χ2SAR (102) = 110.34.
From equation (15) we note that the estimates of (va− wa)it−1 and ut−1 are
both statistically significant in the nonlinear part of the model. The estimate
of the slope parameter, γ, is higher as compared with the estimate based on
the inverted square specification while the estimate of the location parameter,
c, is almost unaﬀected. These results imply that the long—run insider weight
increases from 0.087 in the low-wage regime to 0.189 in the high-wage regime
while the absolute value of the partial long—run unemployment elasticity
increases from 0.014 to 0.052.
Finally, we estimate a similar LSTR1 model using regional panel data.
The wage variable, Wj , is now manufacturing wage costs per worker while
V Aj is manufacturing value added per worker and TPj is the payroll tax rate
in municipality j. We include the county unemployment rate, Uc, while the
outside wage, WAj, is the average of manufacturing wage costs per worker
outside municipality j. Results using data for 322 Norwegian municipalities
for the time period 1974—1992 are given by14
d∆wjt = ·0.033
(1.11)
(va− wa)jt−1 − 0.0130
(1.57)
uct−1
¸
{1 + exp (−21 (sjt−1 − 0.95))}−1
− 0.569
(13.26)
(w − tp− wa)jt−1 + 0.040
(1.54)
(va− wa)jt−1 + 0.0007
(0.12)
uct−1
+ 0.082
(3.71)
∆vajt + 0.681
(12.90)
∆waj + 0.569
(3.72)
∆tpj (16)
T = 18 [1974− 92], N = 322, Method: GMM(1), Q = 2.11,bσ (%) = 6.55, m1 = −10.35, m2 = −0.48, χ2SAR (123) = 132.9.
14Lower case letters denote log transformed variables, see Appendix A.2 for definition
and sources. The regional wage equation also contains time dummies for the wage and
price freeze in 1979 and the income regulation law in 1988—89.
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The estimates imply that the feedback eﬀects of value added per worker is
increasing in relative wages, sjt−1 = Wjt−1/WAjt−1. The estimated long—
run insider weight is 0.07 in the low—wage regime and 0.13 in the high—wage
regime. The estimated partial long—run elasticity of county unemployment is
positive in the low—wage regime and -0.02 in the high—wage regime. However,
the estimated eﬀects are not significant, neither in the linear part nor in the
nonlinear part of the model. If we exclude county unemployment from the
linear part, the estimate of uct−1 in the nonlinear part is -0.012 with a t—value
of 3.53 while the estimates of (va− wa)jt−1 remain insignificant from zero.15
Although the evidence is weaker, the main results based on the regional data
set are consistent with those reported above using industry panel data.
8 Concluding comments
The main issue in the present paper has been to test whether or not the
eﬀects on industry wages of internal and external forces depend upon the
industry’s relative wage position. To do so, we make use of panel data and
formulate a smooth transition regression model including relative wages as
the transition variable.
The paper provides strong empirical evidence of nonlinear industry wage
responses to industry profitability, outside wages and unemployment. The
estimated long—run insider weight vary from 0.07 for low—wage industries to
0.16 for high—wage industries while the elasticity of the outside wage vary
from 0.84 for high—wage industries to 0.93 for low—wage industries. The
estimated partial unemployment eﬀect is very small in the low—wage regime
but rather strong in high—wage industries. Aggregate unemployment mainly
aﬀects wages in low—wage sectors indirectly through the eﬀect on the outside
wage. The main results are robust to alternative transformations of the rate
of unemployment, and we also provide some evidence of nonlinear eﬀects
using regional panel data.
Our interpretation is that the nonlinear responses reflect asymmetric wage
comparison eﬀects. Workers in low—wage sectors are more concerned with
relative wages than workers in high—wage sectors. Another possible interpre-
tation is that the nonlinear insider eﬀect reflect union strenght supposed to
15It should be noted that the estimates in the linear model given by
cwjt = − 0.55
(12.03)
(w − tp−wa)jt−1 + 0.07
(3.55)
(va−wa)jt−1 − 0.07
(2.99)
uct−1
+0.09
(3.81)
∆vajt + 0.67
(12.41)
∆wajt + 0.54
(3.46)
∆tpj ,
are all significant from zero.
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be positively correlated with wages. However, if the nonlinear insider eﬀect
reflects union strenght we should expect to find larger unemployment eﬀects
in low—wage industries than in high—wage industries. The results reported
above are not consistent with such a view.
The results based on the nonlinear model imply smaller average long—run
reﬀects of value added per hour and unemployment than the corresponding
estimates obtained from the linear model. Also, the nonlinear model implies
more speedy wage adjustments as compared to the results from the linear
model. One possible interpretation of these findings is that neglected param-
eter heterogeneity makes the linear model misspecified which again produces
biased estimates.
Throughout we have assumed that the relevant outside wage is the average
wage outside the sector in question. However, since we suppose that workers
in any sector are mainly concerned with their wage relative to wages in higher
paid sectors an alternative modelling strategy would be to allow the outside
wage diﬀer across sectors.
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A Data sources and definitions
A.1 The industry data set
• Wi =Wage costs per manhour in industry i. Source: National Account
Statistics (NA), Statistics Norway (SN).
• V Ai = Factor income per hour worked in industry i. Source: NA, SN.
• WAi = Average wage costs per manhour outside industry i. Source:
NA, SN.
• Pc = The oﬃcial consumer price index. Source: NA, SN.
• U = Aggregate unemployment rate, per cent. Source: Labour Market
Statistics, SN, and NA, SN.
• H =Normal working time per week in manufacturing. Source: Rødseth
and Holden (1990).
• tp = log of 1+ average payroll tax rate. Source: NA, SN.
• ti = log of 1—average income tax rate on housholds. Source, NA, SN.
19
A.2 The regional data set
• Wj = Manufacturing wage costs per worker in municipality j. Source:
Manufacturing Statistics (MS), SN.
• V Aj = Manufacturing value added at factor prices per worker in mu-
nicipality j: Source: MS, SN.
• WAj =Average manufacturing wage costs outside municipality j. Source:
MS, SN.
• Uc = Unemployment rate in municipality j, per cent, Source: Labour
Market Statistics, SN.
• tpj = log of 1+payroll tax rate in municipality j. Source: Norwegian
Tax Inspectorate.
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Figure 1: The transition function
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Figure 2: The estimated insider weight
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Figure 3: The estimated outsider weight
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Figure 4: The estimated long-run unemployment coeﬃcient
24
Table 1: Linearity tests
Hypotheses Test values [p—values]
H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 χ2 (6) = 18.53 [0.005]
H04: β3 = 0 χ2 (2) = 0.94 [0.625]
H03: β2 = 0 | β3 = 0 χ2 (2) = 4.16 [0.125]
H02: β1 = 0 | β2 = β3 = 0 χ2 (2) = 9.24 [0.010]
H0va: β12 = β22 = β32 = 0 χ
2 (3) = 9.37 [0.025]
H0u−2 : β13 = β23 = β33 = 0 χ
2 (3) = 12.21 [0.007]
Notes: The Table reports results for χ2 (df) Wald-tests, implemented in
DPD by Arellano and Bond (1988). The first four tests are computed by run-
ning the auxiliary regression given by (10) with exit−1 = £(va− wa)it−1 , U−2t−1¤T ,
while the last two test the hypotheses of no separate nonlinear eﬀects in these
two variables.
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Table 2: Tests of no remaining nonlinearity
Hypotheses Test values [p—values]
H∗0: β∗1 = β∗2 = β∗3 = 0 χ2 (6) = 6.34 [0.386]
H∗04: β∗3 = 0 χ2 (2) = 1.91 [0.385]
H∗03: β∗2 = 0 | β∗3 = 0 χ2 (2) = 1.55 [0.461]
H∗02: β∗1 = 0 | β∗2 = β∗3 = 0 χ2 (2) = 0.17 [0.919]
Notes: The Table reports results for χ2 (df) Wald-tests, implemented in
DPD by Arellano and Bond (1988). The tests are computed by running the
auxiliary regression given by (14) with exit−1 = £(va− wa)it−1 , U−2t−1¤T .
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